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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JANET BOWCUTT,
Plaintiff and Appellee

:
:
:

CASE NO. 940361

v.

:
;
:

PRIORITY 15

DON LESLIE BOWCUTT,
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an Order of the Fourth District Court
setting the amount of child support for minor child David Charles
Bowcutt.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(i) (1994).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1.

Did

the

Appellant

fail

to

preserve

the

issue

of

Guardianship, by never requested a ruling on the issue, and,
additionally, informing the Court that the issue of Guardianship
was "moot" at the Evidentiary Hearing held on March 18, 1994, (T.
14), and by only now attempting to resurrect and challenge the

issue (essentially) for the first time on appeal?
This Court will not review issues that are raised for the
first time on appeal.

State in re Schreuder, 649 P. 2d 19, 22

(Utah 1982).
2.

Did

the

Appellant

fail

to

preserve

the

issue

of

jurisdiction, by failing to file any sport of appeal of challenge
to the Ruling On The Order To Show Cause, held November 4, 1993,
which addressed the issue of jurisdiction, by later accepting the
Ruling issued November 24, 1993, regarding jurisdiction, and then,
on

or

about

January

18, 1994, by

making

a Request

for

Full

Evidentiary Hearing, and attending the Hearing with his counsel,
and never, at any time since the November 4, 1993 Order To Show
Cause, raising the issue of jurisdiction, and only now raising the
issue for the first time on appeal?
This Court will not review issues that are raised for the
first time on appeal.

State in re Schreuder, 649 P. 2d 19, 22

(Utah 1982).
3.

Did the Appellant fail to preserve the issue of Setting

Aside Order Appointing Guardian, by failing to bring his Motion For
Order To Show Cause To Set Aside Order Appointing Guardian and
Conservator (filed on December 13, 1993), by either scheduling a
hearing on the matter or filing a Notice To Submit For Decision,
pursuant

to

Rule

Administration,

4-501

while

at

(l)(d)

of

the

same

the
time

Utah

Code

failing

of
to

Judicial
voice

an

objection to jurisdiction at any subsequent hearings held Before
Judge Hansen, and only now attempting to raise the issue for the
2

first time on appeal? ( In addition, counsel for Appellant declared
the issue of Guardianship "moot" at the Evidentiary Hearing held on
March 18, 1994, (T. page 14))
This Court will not review issues that are raised for the
first time on appeal*

State in re Schreuder, 649 P. 2d 19, 22

(Utah 1982) .
4. Does Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.5(8) (b) even apply to the
facts of this matter concerning the social security survivorship
benefits, and if so, does it require fmandate) the trial court to
"offset" the Social Security benefits received by the minor child
against the obligor Appellant's obligation, and, even if it is
permissible to do so, does Judge Hansen's Ruling amount to a
manifest injustice or inequity so much so that there exists
evidence of clear abuse of Judge Hansen's discretion?
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's
decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d at
1056, 1055 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Turner v. Turner. 649 P.2d 6,
8 (Utah 1982)); see also Whitehead v. Whitehead, No. 910205-CA,
slip op. at 3 (Utah App.

Aug. 7, 1992).

5. Does the Appellants' own failure to convince the judge
through marshalling the evidence in support his position (with
testimony or evidence regarding his contention that he has more
than "one full-time" job), or that the monthly income figure should
be other than that ultimately considered by the Court, when he had
the opportunity to do so once having raised the issue, amount to
3

error by the Court such that the issue should be retried or the
holding

invalidated;

characterized

and

even

to constitute

if

nominal

the

circumstances

error, did

Judge

might

be

Hansen's

Ruling amount to a manifest injustice or inequity, that amounts to
a clear abuse of Judge Hansen's discretion.
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's
decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P. 2d at
1056, 1055 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6,
8 (Utah 1982)); see also Whitehead v. Whitehead, No. 910205-CA,
slip op. at 3 (Utah App.

Aug. 7, 1992).

6. Does Utah Code Ann § 78-45-7.5 (4)(a) enable the Appellant
to avoid the admission

(under penalty of perjury) in his tax

returns that he has a taxable income of $7000 per month, and then
subtract tax and student loan payments from his declared taxable
income, and even if he might be allowed this double standard, does
the denial of such deductions by the trial court, amount to a
manifest injustice or inequity so much so that there was a clear
abuse of Judge Hansen's discretion?
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's
decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d at
1056, 1055 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Turner v. Turner. 649 P.2d 6,
8 (Utah 1982)); see also Whitehead v. Whitehead, No. 910205-CA,
slip op. at 3 (Utah App.

Aug. 7, 1992).

7. Does the fact that the Appellant provided no information
4

other than that by the testimony

of the Appellant's

spouse

regarding the fact that there were two children born as issue of
the Appellant's current marriage (T. 49), when he had opportunity
to present additional information as to any additional children,
constitute (in the face of res judicata) grounds for this Court to
invalidate the ruling or reopen the issue, and even if so, does
Judge Hansen's Ruling amount to a manifest injustice or inequity
that amounts to a clear abuse of Judge Hansen's discretion.
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's
decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d at
1056, 1055 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6,
8 (Utah 1982)); see also Whitehead v. Whitehead, No. 910205-CA,
slip op. at 3 (Utah App.

Aug. 7, 1992).

8. Was the Appellant under a continuing obligation to pay
child support when the custodial parent died and the minor child
did not reside, with the Appellant, and if so, was the award of
child support, retroactive to the death of the custodial parent, a
manifest injustice or clear abuse of discretion?
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's
decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d at
1056, 1055 (Utah App; 1987) (citing Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6,
8 (Utah 1982)); see also Whitehead v. Whitehead, No. 910205-CA,
slip op. at 3 (Utah App.

Aug. 7, 1992).

9. Did Judge Hansen have the jurisdiction and discretional
5

authority to award attorney's fees and costs, and if so, was the
award of attorney's fees an abuse of this discretion?
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's
decision and review the issue of the award of attorney's fees on an
abuse of discretion standard.

Morgan v. Morgan r 795 P. 2d 684, 676-

88 (Utah App. 1990) .

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-202.5 (1985)
(1) The parent of an unemancipated minor may appoint a
guardian by written instrument designating the
guardian.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-203 (1985)
Any person interested in the welfare of a minor, or a
minor of 14 years or older, may file with the court in
which the will is probated or the written instrument is
filed a written objection to the appointment before it is
accepted or within 30 days after notice of its
acceptance.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-204 (1985)
The court may appoint a guardian for an unemancipated
minor if all parental rights of custody have been
terminated or suspended by circumstances or prior court
order. A guardian appointed by will under § 75-5-202, or
by
written
instrument
under
§75-5-202.5,
whose
appointment has not been prevented or nullified under
§75-5-203
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-45a-2 (Supp. 1994)
(2) If paternity has been determined or has been
acknowledged according to the laws of this state or any
other state, the liabilities of the father may be
enforced in the same or other proceedings...
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 (1987)
6

The father's liability for past education and necessary
support are limited to a period of four years next
preceding the commencement of an action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.2 (1979)
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the natural
parent or adoptive parent of the primary obligation of
support; furthermore, a stepparent has the same right to
recover support for a stepchild from the natural or
adoptive parent as any other obligee.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(1)(b) (1994)
(gross income includes) (b) income from salaries, wages,
commissions royalties, bonuses, rents
Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.5(8)(b) (1994)
Social Security benefits received by a child due to the
earnings of a parent may be credited as child support to
the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of
that parent.
Utah Code § 78-45-7.5(7)(d) (1994)
Income may not be imputed if any of the following
conditions exist" ..(ii) a parent is physically or
mentally disabled to the extent that he cannot earn
minimum wage.
Utah Code Ann § 78-45-7.5 (4)(a) (1994)
Gross income from self-employment or operation of a small
business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary
expense
required
for self-employment
or
business
operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment
Only those e expenses
necessary to allow the business to operate at a
reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6 (1) (1989)
As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income"
is the amount calculated by subtracting from gross income
alimony previously ordered and paid and child support
previously ordered.
7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant is the natural father of the minor child David
Bowcutt.

The Appellant appeals from an Order On Ruling: Child

Support.
A hearing was held before Judge Steven Hansen on March 18,
1994 in the Fourth District Court, for the purpose of determining
the amount of child support that Appellant should pay for the
support of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt.

On

April 5,

1994, Judge Hansen issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The Order regarding the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was
signed the 13th day of May, 1994, and is the subject of this
appeal. The Order denied the Defendant's request for an offset of
the Social Security

Benefits received by the minor child, David

Bowcutt, set the amount of child support the Appellant is to pay,
entered

a

judgment

for

past

due

child

support, ordered

an

accounting and that Appellant should pay attorneys' fees in the
amount of $1,000.00 and costs in the amount of $105.00.
Appellant filed a notice of Appeal on June 10, 1994.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. David Charles Bowcutt is a minor child, whose mother, Janet
Sue Bowcutt, is deceased and whose father is the Appellant, Don
Leslie Bowcutt.
2. The minor child's parents were divorced prior to the death
of Janet Sue Bowcutt.
8

3. On or about October 27, 1993, an Order to Show Cause was
filed in Fourth District Court by Helen Jensen, Guardian and
Conservator of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, regarding
the issue of child support.
4. On or about October

29, 1993 Appellant, through his

counsel, Robert Moody, filed a Motion to Dismiss along with a
Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss.
5. On or about November 3, 1993, Helen Jensen filed a Response
to Motion To Dismiss Order To Show Cause.
4. On November 4, 1993 an Order To Show Cause hearing was held
before Judge Steven Hansen, regarding the issues of jurisdiction,
child support arrearages and the issue of on-going support.
5. The Appellant was represented by attorney Robert Moody.
6.

Following the arguments from counsel at the Order To Show

Cause Hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement and on
November 24, 1993, the honorable Judge Steven L. Hansen, issued a
Ruling

regarding

the

issues

of

on-going

child

support, and

jurisdiction, and arrearages.
7.

On November 24, 1993, the Court found that the Appellant

had an on-going support obligation to the minor child.
8. On November 24, 1993, the Court found that minor child,
David Charles Bowcutt, did have standing to maintain an action
against his natural father for support, via a Guardian Ad Litemf
and Ron Wilkinson, was appointed as Guardian Ad Litem.
9.

On November 24, 1993, with regard to jurisdiction, the

court found that the court has continuing jurisdiction to make an
9

award of child support, pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(3).
10. The court ordered a special review hearing to "determine
the status and needs of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, as
well as Defendant's

[Appellant's] current income level." (See

Exhibit 1, point # 7 ) .
11. No appeal was filed regarding the November 24, 1993,
Ruling of the Trial Court on the Order To Show Cause held on
November 4, 1993, which included Findings of Fact, and Conclusions
of Law on the issues of jurisdiction and child support obligations.
12.

On December 23, 1993, the hearing was held before Judge

Hansen, regarding the status of the case and the Appellant's
financial status for purposes of establishing the amount of child
support.

Appearing at the hearing held December 23, 1993, the

Appellant's counsel made a reguest for an Evidentiary Hearing,
regarding only the amount of the child support, not whether there
should be child support.
13. No appeal was filed regarding the court's decision to
conduct an Evidentiary Hearing to establish the amount of child
support obligation of the Appellant.
14. On March 21, 1994, an Evidentiary Hearing was held,
regarding the sole issue of the amount of Appellants child support
obligation for the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt.
15. The minor child was not present

in court, but was

represented by his Guardian Ad Litem, Ron Wilkinson.
16. The minor child's maternal grandmother, and Guardian and
Conservator, Helen Jensen, was also present, with her counsel,
10

Rosemond Blakelock.
17. The Trial

Court, at the Evidentiary

Hearing, heard

argument and testimony regarding the Appellant's ability to provide
support for the minor child, David Bowcutt, and the said minor
child's need for on-going support.
18. The Appellant's counsel, Robert Moody informed the trial
court, on March 18, 1994, that (the two cases were agreeably
consolidated) and the issue of Guardianship was "moot" and did not
proceed to address the issue any further.
19. The Trial Court then took the matter of the amount of
child support under advisement, and on or about April 5, 1994, made
a Ruling, issuing

Findings of

Fact and Conclusions

of Law,

concerning the amount of child support to be assessed.
20. The issue of the custodial

status

of the minor child, was

never brought before the trial court, either at the Order To Show
Cause, held on November 4, 1994, the subsequent hearing held
December 23, 1993, or the Evidentiary Hearing held March 18, 1994.
21.

Appellant, either personally or through counsel, made a

general appearance at all hearings,

provided testimony to the

court regarding his opinion as to the monthly expenses and needs of
his minor child, David Bowcutt, and in all other matters submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court, without objection.
22. On the 24th day of December, 1993, the 30-day appeal
period on the November 24, 1993 Ruling (Findings and Conclusions)
concerning jurisdiction and the obligation (not amount), ran out.
23. On the 27th day of January, 1994 (allowing for a few
11

holidays) the 30-day appeal period on the December 23, 1993 Ruling,
ran out.
24. On the 13th day of May, 1994, Judge Hansen issued the
Ruling establishing the amount of the child support, from which
Ruling the Appellant appeals.
25. Appellant filed the notice of appeal on or about the 10th
of June, 1994.
26. It is the child's

right

to support

that is at the heart of

this matter, and neither the Notice of Appeal, nor the Docketing
Statement, nor the Request for Summary Disposition were mailed to,
or served upon, the Guardian Ad Litem (legal counsel) for the minor
child. See the mailing Certificates to the Notice of Appeal,
Docketing Statement and the Request for Summary Disposition, on
file with this Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Several of Appellants' claims were waived either by failure to
assert them at or before the Evidentiary Hearing or by failure to
adequately address them on appeal. These include:
1.

Appellant's

claims

regarding

Guardianship

and

application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-204;
2. Appellant's claim that jurisdiction is an issue;
3. Appellant's claim that it is appropriate to now rule
on the Motion To Set Aside Order Appointing Guardian.
The section of the Utah Probate Code that Appellant claims
12

should have been followed by the lower court, §75-5-204, was never
raised as an issue at the Evidentiary Hearing.

In addition,

counsel for the Appellant stated to the Honorable Judge Hansen that
the matter of guardianship was "moot", thus waiving any additional
claims. (T. 14).
Even if § 75-5-204 should have been followed, the Appellant
has misread and misapplied the applicable sections.
Appellant failed to marshal any evidence supporting his
contention

that

this

court

should

ignore

long-established

procedural law against making a ruling on appeal, on any issue that
has never been contested or raised in the lower court.

Further,

Appellant asks this court to overrule a decision that has never
been made —

a procedural impossibility.

The remaining issues raised by Appellant are unsupported by
any argument or case law supporting his position, or reaching the
procedural standard of demonstrating that there was an abuse of
judicial discretion. The standard of review was not even addressed
by Appellant.
Once the Appellant agreed and stipulated to the Appointment of
the Guardian Ad Litem,

(T. 14), stipulated to the consolidation of

all matters, (T. 3 ) , and stipulated that the only remaining issue
was the determination of the amount of the amount of child support
(based upon the status and needs of the minor child, and the
Defendant's income (T. 3 ) , the only legitimate issues which may
even be considered on appeal would be those contested and addressed
at the Evidentiary Hearing.
13

ARGUMENT

POINT I,
APPELLANT WAIVED SEVERAL OF THE ISSUES
RAISED IN HIS BRIEF, BY FAILING TO RAISE
THEM BELOW OR BY FAILING TO SUPPORT THEM
WITH SUFFICIENT LEGAL ANALYSIS ON APPEAL
Appellant asserts claims in his Statement of Issues and
Statement of Facts that were not raised in the Evidentiary Hearing
held on March 18, 1994.

Further, some of these issues are not

clearly briefed in the Argument portion of Appellants7 brief.
However, to the extent that the issues are nominally raised, this
Court

should

not

consider

them.

Other

claims

are

simply

unsupported by sufficient citations to relevant authority or legal
analysis.

A. Claims Regarding Application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-204
First, Appellant appears to assert that Utah Code Ann § 75-5204 (1985), applies because the Appellant's parental rights have
not been terminated.

The Appellant either failed to read the

entire statute, or failed to understand the statute. Clearly, this
statute does provide that the court may appoint a guardian for an
unemancipated minor "if" all parental rights of custody have been
terminated. However, the parental rights of the Appellant were not
ever an issue before the court, and so this particular section of
the guardianship statute does not apply at all. In addition,
Appellant failed to cite to the entire statute, omitting the (more
14

applicable) second half of the sentence in Utah Code Ann. § 75-5204 (1985), the statute reads as follows:
The court may appoint a guardian for an unemancipated
minor if all parental rights of custody have been
terminated or suspended by circumstances or prior court
order. A guardian appointed by will under § 75-5-202, or
by
written
instrument
under
§75-5-202.5, whose
appointment has not been prevented or nullified under
§75-5-203
The testimony at the Evidentiary Hearing from the Appellant
was that the minor child refused to live with the Appellant. (T 55,
"He won't stay with me").

Had the issue been challenged and heard

as a contested issue at the Evidentiary Hearing, the Appellant's
own testimony was that the physical custody of the minor child was,
at a minimum, "suspended."
However, the purpose of the Evidentiary Hearing (which is the
subject of this instant appeal) was solely for the purpose os
setting the amount of child support, and the issue of guardianship
was not addressed.
Second, The Guardian was appointed under Utah Code Ann. § 755-202.5, which permits appointment of a Guardian in instances where
the parental rights have not been terminated. Appellant received
notification of the Guardianship Hearing, was in fact present in
the Probate courtroom, and voiced no timely objection to the
appointment.
Third, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-203 the Appellant,
following the hearing, filed an objection in the form of his
Motion, although it was not timely.

This Motion was itself

rendered moot when the Appellant by, and through, his counsel of
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record, Robert Moody, accepted the Appointment of the Guardianship,
in open court, at the Evidentiary Hearing (T 14).

B. Claims regarding November 24, 1993 Ruling.
Issue two (2) of the Appellants7 Statement of Issues (App. Br.
at 2) asserts that the Trial Court erred in proceeding under the
parties' original divorce action and asserts that there was no
jurisdiction.

(The issue is discussed

in Issue Two of the

Appellant's Brief on the issue of whether or not the November 24,
1993 Ruling was in error. App. Br. at 15-17).
To begin with, it is well established law that jurisdiction
must be addressed at the initial stages of a proceeding, and must
be considered waived when the parties appear, and especially, as
here, when they appear at a succession of hearings, and file a
succession of pleadings —

none of which raised the jurisdictional

challenge.
Appellant did not file an objection to the Ruling of the Trial
Court on November 24, 1993, nor did he file an appeal of the Ruling
with the Appeals Court. Neither did the Appellant object to the
November 24, 1993 Ruling at the Evidentiary Hearing. In fact, the
Appellant himself evidenced his acceptance of the Court's subject
matter

jurisdiction

and personal

jurisdiction.

For example,

Appellant personally appeared at the evidentiary Hearing on March
18, 1994, with his counsel (thus waiving any right to object to
personal jurisdiction), and asked the court to consolidate all
matters under one case number, (T. 3, the court accepted the
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Stipulation of all parties to consolidate the pending matters,
resolving or waiving any challenge to subject matter jurisdiction).
The court stated that the "fundamental issue", and purpose of the
hearing was solely to determine the "status and needs of David
Charles Bowcutt" (T 3).
Thus, while the trial court may or may not have lost it's
jurisdiction, that

jurisdictional

issue became moot when the

Appellant appeared, accepted jurisdiction of the court, and thus
waived his right to raise jurisdictional issues.
For

example

Appellant's

counsel

elicited

testimony

from

the

Appellant regarding whether or not Appellant felt that he should
support the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, to which the
Appellant answered "Yes, I think someone needs to support him" (T
54). Thus, the Appellant, through his own testimony and appearance
on the witness stand, accepted jurisdiction, the consolidation of
the case, and the process of proceeding under the original decree.
This court cannot decide an issue which was not challenged
before the trial court, but is being challenged for the first time,
on appeal.

State in re Schreuder, 649 P. 2d 19, 22 (Utah 1982).

C. Claims Regarding the Motion To Set Aside Order Appointing
guardian and Conservator
Issue three (3) of the Appellants Statement of Issues, is a
restatement of Issue one.

However, because it is two separate

issues in the Appellant's brief, it will, again be addressed.
Not only did the Appellant fail to follow the appropriate
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procedures regarding his Motion To Set Aside Order Appointing
Guardian and Conservator, counsel for the Appellant withdrew any
chance of having the matter heard by the trial court, when he (Mr.
Moody) stated to the court, at the Evidentiary Hearing held March
18, 1994: "Now, We've consolidated the guardianship matter, your
Honor.

We had some problem with that appointment because of

certain thing, but I think that now becomes moot because the Court
has appointed a Guardian Ad Litem" (T 14).

The court did not

address the issue of Guardianship, or the Motion To Set Aside Order
Appointing Guardianship any further, because counsel for Appellant
stated that they believed the matter to be moot. Appellant cannot
now on appeal challenge a matter conceded at the trial court.

POINT II
THE APPELLANTS7 ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE LOWER COURT'S
CONSIDERATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDS IS WITHOUT
LEGAL ANALYSIS OR EVIDENCE OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The discussion of Issue Four (4) of the Appellant's Brief, is
based upon the assumption that the Appellants obligation should be
reduced by the survivorship benefits received by the child as a
result of his mother's death, or that the minor child's deceased
mother should contribute somehow to the support of the minor child.
(App. Br. at 20).
Pursuant to the Utah Code Ann.§ 78-45-7.5(8)(b):
Social Security benefits received by a child due to the
earnings of a parent may be credited as child support to
the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of
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that parent.
To begin with, the Appellant mis-interprets or misapplies this
statute. This statute might allow the obligor a credit for social
security benefits received by the child or other spouse, if the
benefits were generated by the obligor's work history or actions.
But in this case, the benefits are survivorship benefits, created
by and related to the mother's death, not the obligor's actions.
Further, Appellant cites no authority for his bald assertion
that the deceased mother should have imputed to her as income the
child's Social Security survivorship benefits, or that she should
have imputed income at all.
Even if the benefits might be used as imputed income, the
obvious question is how much income should be imputed to the minor
child's deceased mother?
Appellant suggests an outlandish formula wherein he would
require the court to impute to the deceased party a certain income.
Appellant failed to address the fact that pursuant to Utah Code §
78-45-7.5(7)(d) "Income may not be imputed if any of the following
conditions

exist"

..(ii) a parent

is physically

or mentally

disabled to the extent that he cannot earn minimum wage."
It seems equally outlandish to have to state that death certainly
constitutes a physical disability which is going to keep the minor
child's mother from having a wage imputed to her, much less the
$1,750.00 per month salary that Appellant requests. (App. Br at
20).

Such absurd rhetoric is yet another ruse for the Appellant to

avoid paying child support, by having his child support reduced.
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The Appellant failed to present any authority for his personal
application

of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5

(8)(b).

Appellant's

failure to support his bare assertions with authority and analysis
should also result in this Court refusing to consider the issue.
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (1984).
In addition to the Appellant's failure to state the legal
basis

for

his

contentions, he

fails

to

state

overruling the decision of the lower court.

the

basis

for

Due to the equitable

nature of child support proceedings, the Court of Appeals accords
substantial deference to the trial court's findings and gives the
trial

court considerable

orders.

Woodward v.

latitude

in fashioning

child

support

Woodward, 709 P. 2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Hill

v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App. 1992).

Absent an abuse of

discretion, the Appeals Court "will not disturb the trial court's
actions."

Hill. 841 P.2d at 724.

Appellant

cites

to

"common

sense"

arguments, without citing one case,

as

the

basis

of

his

or statute to support his

contentions, (App. Br. at 20) and offers his preferred solution.
However, the standard of review is whether the Court abused its
discretion.

The Appellant not only failed to marshal any evidence

of abuse of discretion, he also failed to acknowledge that it was
the Appellant himself who requested the court not consider the
guidelines at all in coming to a decision. (T 25) It takes little
more than common sense to come to the conclusion that even if the
Court strayed from the guidelines in reaching a conclusion, it did
so at the insistence of the Appellant, and the Appellant, of all
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people, cannot now cry "foul" of the result.

POINT III
APPELLANT CITED NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CONTENTION
THAT HIS TOTAL INCOME SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
Available evidence indicates that the Appellant, through his
counsel, Robert Moody, supplied the court with the information
upon which the lower court made it's findings and conclusions. For
example, Mr. Moody informed the court that the [child support]
Guidelines are "only advisory" (T. 72), and further informed the
court that the Appellant earns "$83,000 a year" (T. 75). Further,
it was Appellant's counsel that proposed to the court that, for
purposes of calculating child support, the Appellant should be
considered to earn $7,000 per month.

The court listened to

proffered evidence from all counsel present, including counsel for
Appellant.

Counsel for Appellant did not deny that the Appellant

worked the equivalent of one full time job, and in fact, provided
the figures and information to the court, to which he now objects!
(T.

71-72).
The income information provided to the lower by Appellant7s

attorney, Robert Moody, was clear regarding the probable earning
potential

($84,000

(physician).

per

year)

his

education

and

training

Given Appellant's failure to provide any other

information to the lower court, and in light of the fact that the
Ruling of the lower court used the figures provided by Appellant,
there does not appear to be an error in the court's determination
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of Appellant's income.
The Appellant makes arguments and provides "testimony11 in his
brief, that were never, considered or made available to, the lower
court.

Appellant's contentions that he works "extensive weekend

and after hour on-call obligations" was not introduced at the lower
court, and is now prohibited from making new arguments. (App. Br.
at 21).
The Appellant states that he "insists that it is not up to the
Court's discretion to decide whether a second job will be included
in the determination of gross income". (App. Br. at 21) However,
the Appellant fails to marshal the evidence or cite to statute or
case law to support such a contention.
Appellant's

counsel

who

informed

the

In addition - it was
lower

court

that

the

guidelines were advisory.
Appellant's failure to support his bare assertions with
authority and analysis should also result in this Court refusing to
consider the issue. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (1984).
In addition, the standard of review for such matters is one of
abuse of discretion.

In cases where the Court of Appeals accords

substantial deference to the trial court's findings and gives the
trial court considerable latitude in fashioning child support
orders, the court will look at the evidence available to the lower
court. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Hill
v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App. 1992).

Absent an abuse of

discretion, the Appeals Court "will not disturb the trial court's
actions."

Hill. 841 P.2d at 724.
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In this case, it was the Appellant, through his counsel, Mr.
Robert Moody, who supplied to the court the information and made
the suggestion that the lower court consider the Appellant to earn
"$7,000.00 per month for the purposes of child support".
Appellant puts forth the argument in his Brief that the
worksheet (used to figure child support) "is only a guideline to be
followed by the court at its own discretion" (App. Br. at page 22),
and that the guidelines should not be used at all (T 25). These
two statements fly in the face if his arguments regarding the
appropriate application of the guidelines. Try as he might to argue
otherwise, no court should allow him to have it both ways.
Traditionally, the court accords the trial court considerable
discretion to the lower court and thus, the lower court's "actions
are entitled to a presumption of validity." Allred v. Allredr 797
P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting Hansen v. Hansen. 736 P.2d
1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987)).

In addition, the lower courts

determination "will not be upset on appeal unless the evidence
clearly preponderates to the contrary or [this court) determine[s]
that the court has abused its discretion." Durfee v. Durfee, 796
P.2d 713, 717 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting Ostler v. Ostler. 789 P.2d
713, 715 (Utah App. 1990)).
/
/
/
/
/
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POINT IV
UTAH CODE DOES NOT REQUIRE THE COURT TO
SUBTRACT TAX AND MEDICAL LOAN PAYMENTS
FROM GROSS INCOME, NOR ALLOW THEM,
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE DEDUCTED
The Appellant's claim, in Issue six(6) that the lower court
should have subtracted tax and student loan payments from his gross
income is made without any reference to code or case authority, and
without (virtually) any analysis.

Such a failure should result in

this Court refusing to consider the issue. State v. Amicone, 689
P.2d 1341, 1344 (1984).
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

78-45-7.5(1)(b)

(1994),

defines

"gross

income" as "income from salaries, wages, commissions". Even if the
Appellant's

claim

that

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

78-45-7.5(4)(a)

is

applicable, it would not enable the Appellant to deduct tax and
loan payments from his income. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(4) (a),
states clearly that "Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from
gross

receipts".

Appellant

is

attempting

to

deduct

items

specifically disallowed under the code and by the work

sheets

approved by the courts of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6 (1), Adjusted Gross Income, states
that

adjusted

gross

income

"...is

the

amount

calculated

by

subtracting from gross income, alimony previously ordered and paid
and child support previously ordered". No other deductions are
allowed.
Therefore, the claim made by the Appellant that credit for
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tax and student loan payments should be given, has been made in bad
faith, and without any basis in law.
It is inappropriate, upon appeal, for the Appellant to insist
upon the application of the guidelines, when it was counsel for the
Appellant who requested that the court not use the Guidelines at
all. (T at 24).

Appellants7 counsel, Robert Moody, referred the

court to Durfee v. Pur fee, 796 P. 2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) and stated
as follows:
Mr. Moody: We cant, your Honor (just use the guidelines
and come up with a figure), because the guidelines are
only advisory. They're not mandatory. I think the law
the Court is searching for is Durfey versus Durfey,
Pacific 2d. 796
It's a case very similar where the mother died. In that
situation the Court stated that the overview section of
the guidelines indicate that final orders of the case
shall be made at the discretion of the court based on
the facts of the individual case.
It went on and talked about the duty of the father to
furnish the necessaries.
The trial court should take
into consideration what the needs of the child are.
Based upon the needs and based upon the father's
abilities, that what we should determine here.

At that point, counsel for Appellant went even further when Robert
Moody requested that the court not use the guidelines at all, when
he proffered as follows:
Mr. Moody: Well, my point is that we just don't go to the
guidelines and say, "this is what it is."
(T. 25)
Following Mr. Moody's request that the Guidelines not be used,
Helen Jensen, Guardian of the minor child, testified as to the
needs of the minor child, and the fact that Helen Jensen was the
sole source of support for the minor child, submitting to the Court
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receipts and providing testimony as to the minor child's needs and
generally

providing

testimony

that

Appellant

had

refused

to

voluntarily support the minor child. (T. 26-33)

POINT V
WHILE APPELLANT AND HIS CURRENT WIFE HAVE
MAY A TOTAL OF THREE CHILDREN, THE TESTIMONY
PROVIDED TO THE LOWER COURT WAS THAT THERE
WERE ONLY TWO CHILDREN AS A PRODUCT OF THE
APPELLANT'S CURRENT MARRIAGE

While it was discussed in the Evidentiary Hearing that the
Appellant and his current wife have three children in the home, the
lower court gave the Appellant credit for two children from his
current marriage, based upon the testimony of the Appellant's wife,
Nora Bowcutt.
Nora Bowcutt, was duly sworn and testified as follows:
Mr. Moody:
Q. Mrs. Bowcutt, tell us you name and your relationship to Dr.
Don Bowcutt.
A. My name is Nora Bowcutt and I'm Don Bowcutt's wife.
Q. And how long have you been married to Dr. Bowcutt?
A. Thirteen years.
Q. How many children have been born as issue to that marriage?
A. Two
(T. 48-49)
There was no other direct testimony regarding the number of
children in the Appellant7s home. While there was some discussion
stating the fact that there were other children in the home,
(presumably Nora Bowcutt's by a previous marriage), the exact
circumstances and situation was not made available to the lower
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court. If there was an error and/or mistake of fact, it was not
brought to the attention of the lower court.

The lower court,

based upon the testimony of Nora Bowcutt, gave the Appellant credit
for two children in his home.
There is no available evidence, or even a claim by Appellant,
that the court abused it's discretion in allowing the Appellant
credit for two children in the home. Indeed, the statute itself, is
not mandatory, and the credit could have been denied completely.
Given this legal fact, the exclusion of one child is irrelevant.
In questions regarding the award of child support, the Court
of Appeals accords substantial deference to the trial court's
findings and gives the trial court considerable

latitude in

fashioning child support orders, the court will look at the
evidence available to the lower court. Woodward v. Woodward, 709
P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Hill v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722r 724 (Utah
App, 1992). Absent an abuse of discretion, the Appeals Court "will
not disturb the trial court's actions."

Hill, 841 P.2d at 724.

POINT VI
IT WAS THE APPELLANT WHO ELIMINATED ALL ISSUES
EXCEPTING THE APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT
AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE APPELLANT'S INCOME
The Appellant, through his counsel, Robert Moody, stipulated
to the appointment of the Guardian Ad Litem, stating at the
Evidentiary Hearing that the appointment was "appropriate and we
think that it's helpful" (T at 14). The Appellant also stipulated
to the consolidation of all pending matters (T. 3) thus waiving any
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further jurisdictional objections.
Appellant agreed to proceed in the Evidentiary Hearing on the
matters set forth as the "fundamental" issue or reason for the
hearing (being status and needs of minor David Bowcutt and the
determination of the Appellants current income level).
Although the Appellant had opportunity to raise other issues
during the Evidentiary Hearing, he did not.
Once the minor child's Guardian Ad Litem was appointed, the
court proceeded under the consolidated cases, using the parties
original divorce action as reference number, but stated clearly
that the action could be maintained by the minor child, through his
Guardian Ad Litem, and cited to Faver v. Hansen, 803 P. 2d 1275
(Utah App. 1990).

(See Addendum 1, Ruling April 5, 1993, page 2)

At the Evidentiary Hearing, there was no objection to that
decision,

(to

consolidate

and

proceed),

because

Appellant's counsel who requested an Evidentiary

it was

the

Hearing and it

was Appellant's counsel who filed the Motion To Consolidate.

POINT VII
THE APPELLANT WAS UNDER A CONTINUING OBLIGATION
TO SUPPORT THE MINOR CHILD - EVEN IF HE DID NOT
DO SO AFTER THE TIME THE CUSTODIAL PARENT DIED
The question of retroactivity is applicable in a case where
the minor child does not reside with the parent who is obligated to
provide that minor child's support.
It is clear that the minor child, has independent standing to
request child support. Utah courts have long held that the right to
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receive child support is an unalienable right, belonging to the
child, and cannot be bartered away by the child's parent or
parents. Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981); Hansen v.
Gossett, 590 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1979) (right to support belongs
to the child); State Division of Family Services v. Clark, 554 P.2d
1310, 1311-12 (Utah 1976) (child support duty is continuing and
right to receive it is unalienable); Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d
141, 143 (Utah 1974) (a father cannot divest himself of the
obligation to support, nor defeat the child's right to support).
The right to child support is a right of the children themselves.
Hansen v. Gossettf 590 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1979), quoting Wasescha v.
Wasescha, Utah, 548 P.2d 895 (1976); see also, Mason v. Mason. 148
or. 34, 34 P.2d 328 (1934).
The fact that one parent may not be under a current obligation
to

pay

child

support

does

not

terminate

that

parent's

responsibility to pay support in the future. Woodward v. Woodward,
709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985).
Thus, Appellant was obligated to support the minor child, no
matter which case number was used.

However, the consolidation of

all matters, by stipulation, renders the question moot.
In addition, to the case law cited above, the right of a child
to receive support and to maintain an action for support is found
in the Utah Code.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 (1987) ("Every man

shall support his child"); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.2 (1979)
("Nothing contained (within the Uniform Civil Liability for Support
Act] shall act to relieve the natural parent or adoptive parent of
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the primary obligation of support").
More specifically, the Uniform Act on Paternity acknowledges
the right of a child to maintain an action for paternity and for
liabilities

thereof,

including

the

reasonable

expenses

of

pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral
expenses.

Utah Code Ann.§ 78-45a-2 (Supp. 1994).

The Appellant's reliance on Nielson v Nielson, 826 P.2d 1065,
1067

(Utah

App.

1991),

is

misrepresented to the court.
custody was at issue.
was unfit.

either

naive7

or

purposefully

The case (Nielson) was one where

Each parent was contending that the other

Custody (in Nielson) was awarded to the Plaintiff,

Gregory Nielson. Defendant then filed a petition for modification
(as to custody) and Plaintiff filed a counter petition.
The custodial parent (Mr. Neilson) then died.
Mr. Nielson's personal representative attempted to continue to
litigate the issue of custody. The court stated clearly that "upon
the death of the custodial parent, the right to custody of the
children immediately vests in the noncustodial parent"

Nielson v

Nielson, 826 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1991).
There is no issue of custody before the court and it has
never, at any time been represented as an issue.

Appellant's own

testimony evidenced an acknowledgement that the minor child simply
refuses to reside with the Appellant, when he stated "He [minor
child David Bowcutt] won#t stay with me." (T. 55).
The Appellant cannot acknowledge the fact that the minor child
refuses to reside with him, (T. 55), and cannot stipulate to the
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fact that he is obligated to support the minor child (T. 54) in the
Evidentiary Hearing in the lower court, and then file an appeal
claiming that he is somehow being denied custody, or that he has no
obligation to support the minor child.

Those contentions were

resolved by agreement or waiver in the proceedings presented before
the trial court, and cannot now be contested for the first time on
appeal. This Court will not review issues that are raised for the
first time on appeal.

State in re Schreuder. 649 P. 2d 19, 22

(Utah 1982).

POINT VIII
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS APPROPRIATE
AND THE APPEALS COURT SHOULD AWARD ADDITIONAL
FEES TO HELEN JENSEN
The lower court awarded attorney7s fees in the amount of
$1000.00 and costs in the amount of $105.00.

The Appellant

disputes the lower court's ability to award attorney's fees but did
not cite any evidence indicating an abuse of discretion by the
lower court in granting the award. The Appeals Court will presume
the correctness of the trial court's decision and review the issue
of the award of attorney's fees on an abuse of discretion standard.
Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684, 676-88 (Utah App. 1990).
Appellant disputes the lower court's reliance on Lyngle v.
Lyngle 831 PP.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992), and cited instead to Tribe
v. Tribe. 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 2d 213 (1921), and Stubner v. Stubner.
121 Utah 632, 244 P. 2d 650 (1952). While the cases Appellant cites
may have been applicable, they predate the current and better law,,
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and ironically do not rebut the lower court's award of attorney7
fees.
Tribe speaks to one being compelled to bring proceedings
against another. The Ruling by Judge Hansen, issued April 5, 1994,
at point 9, awarded attorney's fees to Mrs. Jensen, and stated in
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that "Mrs. Jensen was
forced to bring this Defendant before the court in order to obtain
support for the minor child" (See Addendum, 1 , Ruling, dated April
5, 1994.) Thus, if Tribe applies at all, it supports the award of
fees by Judge Hansen.
Stubner, stands for the award of attorneys fees when a party
failed to live up the his agreement and forced legal action. Again
this only supports the contentions of the Appellee that she is
entitled to fees, and does not undermine the Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law in the Ruling.
The Appellant did not provide any evidence to indicate that
the lower Courts reliance on Lyngle was an abuse of discretion.
Pursuant to the terms set forth in Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P. 2d 1055,
1056 (Utah App. 1987) Appellant had to show, given the particular
facts of this case, the trial court's decision creates a "manifest
injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of .
discretion."

No particularities were shown.

Unless such a showing is made, the Appeals Court should not
disturb the trial court's ruling that Mrs. Jensen was entitled to
costs and attorney fees.
Further, Appellee, pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of
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Appellate Procedure, asserts that the Appeals Court should assess
damages and attorney's fees against the Appellant.

The court may

make such a determination under Rule 3 3 "where there is no basis
for the argument presented and when the evidence or law is mischaracterized and misstated". Eames v Eames, 735 P. 2d 395, 397
(Utah App. 1987).
In each

and

every

one of the

issues presented

by the

Appellant, the Appellant had no basis for the arguments presented,
and/or

the

evidence

or

statute

cited

does

not

support

the

Appellant7s contentions. Appellant's entire Brief, failed to pass
the test as follows: (Appellants7 issues in order)
Issue One: (Guardianship) - Not capable of appeal, the issue
was resolved by agreement prior to the entry of the Court's Order
being appealed.
Issue Two: Not capable of appeal. Appellant has argued that
custody is or was at issue. He has it. Further, the issue was not
challenged at the Evidentiary Hearing. Appellant stipulated to the
consolidation of all issues at the Evidentiary Hearing.
Issue Three: Not capable of appeal, the issue was resolved by
agreement prior to the entry of the Court's Order being appealed.
Issues Four, Five, Six, and Seven: not capable of appeal, they
are all arguments regarding the enforcement of the guidelines. The
Appellant's counsel, Robert Moody informed the lower court that
Durfey

applied

and

requested

that

the

court

not

apply

the

guidelines, arguing that they are advisory in nature. He cannot cry
"foul"

for the trial Court's deviation
33

from the guidelines.

Appellants' own Brief asserts that the trial court may operate "at
its own discretion" as to child support. (App. Br. at 22).
Issue Eight: Appellant cites to an inapplicable case Nielson,
which is addressing the issue of custody (not an issue before the
lower court), and does not cite to any statute or acknowledge any
case law regarding a parent's legal obligation to support a minor
child.
Issue Nine: Attorney's Fees: Appellant's argument rambles and
is almost incomprehensible. Ironically, the cases cited support the
Appellee, not the Appellant.
The Appellant had competent counsel at trial. This pro se
appeal is a sham, calculated to create hardship on the Appellee,
and used as a means of retribution
pay child support —

as a quid pro quo for having to

it is a transparent attempt to force the

Appellee to incur costs which equal or exceed the child support
awarded. Appellant's appeal creates great financial hardship on
Helen Jensen, and only serves to delay the receipt of (or eliminate
the economic benefit of) child support for the minor child.
tactics are unconscionable and should be discouraged.
Appeals

Court

not

take

steps

to

indicate

Such

Should the

to Appellant

the

inappropriateness of his behavior, he will likely litigate the
matter until the minor child reaches his majority without having
had the benefits of child support to which he is legally and
morally entitled.
Appellee has incurred more than $5,000.00 in fees and costs
associated with fighting this frivolous appeal, and should be
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awarded her fees and costs.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Helen Jensen respectfully
requests that this Court
i. Dismiss the Appeal summarily, or
ii. Affirm the order of the District Court, Order On
Ruling: Child Support, and in either case,
iii. Award her fees and costs as incurred, in the minimum
amount of $5,000.00.

DATED

this

day of September, 1994

L-J^s^mond Blakelc
attorney for Helen Jensen, Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent were mailed to Don Leslie bowcutt, 1130 West State Road,
Pleasant Grove Utah 84602, and to Ron Wilkinson, 1139 South Orem
blvd, Orem, Utah 84057, this/Z^r^iay of September, 1994.

j "y/Pt^
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ADDENDUM

36

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COtMr f ^ •">?
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

i.*

********

JANET SUE BOWCUTT,
RULING

Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER:
vs.

784448131

APRIL 5, 1994
STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE

DON LESLIE BOWCUTT,
Defendant.

********

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 18,
1994 for an evidentiary hearing regarding the defendant's child
support obligation for the parties7 minor child, David Charles
Bowcutt.

Helen Jensen, maternal grandmother, Guardian and

Conservator for the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, was
present and represented by Rose Blakelock.
and represented by Robert Moody.

Defendant was present

Ron Wilkinson, Guardian Ad

Litem for David Charles Bowcutt, was also present.

At that time,

the Court heard discussion and testimony regarding defendant's
ability to provide support for the minor child and the minor
child's status and needs for support and took the matter under
advisement.
On December 23, 1993 attorneys Rose Blakelock, Robert Moody,
John Musselman, and Ron Wilkerson appeared before Judge Steve L.

Hansen for an Order To Show Cause hearing.

At that time, the

Court ordered that a child support order was to be in the file
within thirty days and the order would be retroactive to the
Petition To Modify.

On or about January 18, 1994 defendant filed

a Request For Full Evidentiary Hearing.

On or about January 21,

1994 defendant filed a Motion To Consolidate along with a
Memorandum Of Points And Authorities.

On January 27, 1994 an

Order On Hearing was signed and entered by the Court.

On or

about February 3, 1994 Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator of
David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Motion In Support Defendant's
Motion To Consolidate and a Motion In Support Defendant's Request
For Full Evidentiary Hearing, Request For Information On
Defendant's Income, And Motion For Compliance With Court's Order
Of December 3, 1993.

On or about March 8, 1994 Helen Jensen,

Guardian and Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Notice
To Submit and on March 18, 1994, Mrs. Jensen's counsel filed an
Affidavit In Support Of Attorney's Fees.
The Court, having reviewed the above documentation and the
Court's tape record of the March 18, 1994 hearing, and upon being
advised in the premises, now rules as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

A Decree Of Divorce in the above-entitled matter was

signed and entered on March 2, 1978, whereas plaintiff, Janet
Bowcutt, was awarded custody of the parties' two minor children
and defendant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of

$75.00 per month per child.

On August 3, 1982 the Court entered

an Order, whereas defendant's child support obligation was
increased to $125.00 per month per child.
On or about June 11, 1992 the State of Utah, Department of
Human Services filed a Petition To Modify on behalf of plaintiff,
Janet Bowcutt.

At that time the State of Utah sought to increase

defendant's child support obligation from $125.00 per month to
$763.00 pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6).
On February 5, 1993, Janet Bowcutt, plaintiff and custodial
parent of David Charles Bowcutt, died due to suicide.

On or

about August 13, 1993, Helen Jensen, maternal grandmother of
David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Verified Petition For Appointment
Of Guardian And Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt and on
September 3, 1993 Helen Jensen was appointed as David Charles
Bowcutt's Guardian and Conservator by Judge Guy R. Burningham.
This matter came before the Court on November 4, 1993 for an
Order To Show Cause hearing brought by Helen Jensen, Guardian and
Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt, who was seeking child
support from the defendant on behalf of the minor child.

The

Court issued a Ruling on November 24, 1993, whereas the Court
found that defendant did have an on-going support obligation to
David Charles Bowcutt and ordered that defendant place $125.00
per month in an interest bearing trust account pending final
resolution of this matter, that the $6,653.00 child support
arrearage previously reduced to judgement be collected by Janet
Bowcutt Wing's personal representative pursuant to the Utah
Uniform Probate Code, and that a special review hearing be set

for the limited purpose of determining David Charles Bowcutt's
status and needs as well determining the defendants present
income.

Additionally, the Court appointed Mr- Ron Wilkerson as

David Charles Bowcutt's Guardian Ad Litem-

2.

With regard to defendant's Motion To Consolidate filed

on or about January 21, 1994, the Court agrees that all three
cases, Civil Number 934402209, Civil Number 93400310, and Civil
Number 784448131, in which child support for David Charles
Bowcutt are at issue should be consolidated.

The Court notes

that it previously directed Mr. Ron Wilkerson in the Ruling
issued November 24, 1993 to proceed on this matter under the
parties7 original divorce action, Civil Number 784448131, based
upon the Court's determination that modification of defendant's
monthly child support obligation to David Charles Bowcutt would
be retroactive to the date the State of Utah filed its Petition
To Modify As Intervenor on June 11, 1992. For clarification
purposes, the Court consolidates the other two cases into Civil
Number 784448131.

Counsel is directed to file all documents

pertaining to this matter in Civil Number 784448131 pursuant to
the Court's previous finding that based upon Utah Court of
Appeals' decision in Faver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 (Utah App.
1990), David Charles Bowcutt, via his Guardian Ad Litem, does
have standing to maintain an action against his natural father
for support.

3.

With regard to a determination of defendant's present

income, the Court finds that defendant is a physician who earned
$62,257.26 from his medical practice in 1993 and also earned an
additional $21,845.00 in 1993 from a contract with Utah County
for the provision of medical services to the Utah County Jail for
a total earnings of $84,102,26 in 1993.

See 1993 Miscellaneous

Income Forms of Dr. Don L. Bowcutt.
Defendant maintains that pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(2),
his earnings from his medical practice should be viewed as "one
full-time job" to be used in calculating his child support
obligation for David Bowcutt and that his earnings resulting from
his contract with Utah County should be treated as over-time
earnings and excluded from calculating gross income for purposes
of determining child support.
Helen Jensen, acting in her capacity as David Bowcutt's
Guardian and Conservator, maintains that defendant, as a medical
doctor is a professional and that all income resulting from his
practice of medicine, regardless of where that practice occurs,
should be utilized by the Court in calculating defendant's child
support obligation to David.
Pursuant to U.C.A §78-45-7(3), the Court in determining the
appropriate amount of support, must consider all relevant
factors, including but not limited to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

the standard of living and situation of the parties;
the relative wealth and income of the parties;
the ability of the obligor to earn;
the ability of the obligee to earn;
the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
the ages of the parties; and
the responsibilities of the obligor and obligee for the
support of others.

The Court, noting that defendant has completed his professional

education and developed a medical practice subsequent to the
August 3, 1982 Order which modified his support obligation to
$125.00 per month per child, finds that defendant is engaged in a
medical practice that includes providing his services as a
physician to the Utah County Jail as well as his practice with
Dr. Bell.

The Court, in considering defendant's present income

level, standard of living, and relative wealth as well as the low
level of support that defendant has historically provided for
this minor child, will elect to utilize all of defendant's
earnings resulting from his practice of medicine in determining
defendant's present income level. Therefore, the Court finds
that defendant's average monthly gross income is $7,008.52 based
upon his gross 1993 income of $84,102.26.

($62,257.26 Earnings

From Medical Practice With Carl T. Bell, M.D. + $21,845.00
Earnings From Utah County « $84,102.26 1993 Gross Income).
($84,102.26 1993 Gross Income -s- 12. = $7,008.52 Average Gross
Monthly Income).

4.

With regard to the issue of the needs and status of the

minor child, David Bowcutt, the Court heard testimony from Mrs.
Jensen at the March 18, 1994 hearing as to actual expenses she
has incurred for the care and support of David.

It is

uncontroverted that David has resided with other third parties,
specifically the Tom Prentice family and his sister, Wendy, as
well as Mrs. Jensen during the time period following his mother's
death in February of 1993.

Mrs. Jensen testified that she has

paid money to those other third parties that David has

periodically resided with for his support, specifically giving
Tom Prentice $1,500.00 in September of 1993 for food and support
provided to David.

While Mrs. Jensen was unable to provide the

Court with detailed information on the exact amount of funds she
has expended in David's behalf, she estimated that she has
expended approximately between $250.00 and $500.00 per month for
David's needs, such as food, clothing, medical expenses,
transportation costs, shelter, and other miscellaneous needs.
Additionally, it is uncontroverted that David is currently
receiving $233.00 per month entitlement from Social Security due
to his mother's death.

Mrs. Jensen testified that the Social

Security benefit is deposited directly in David's own bank
account and that he has been using those funds for recreation and
miscellaneous needs. Mrs. Jensen further testifies that she has
had no access to or control over the Social Security entitlement
David receives and that those funds have not been used for
David's care and support.

The Court also heard testimony that

David is not employed as defendant has alleged and has no other
income separate from his Social Security entitlement.
Additionally, the Court heard testimony from the defendant
at the March 18, 1994 hearing as to his belief that monthly
expenses attributable for the care and support of a seventeen
year old boy such as David would be in the range of $500.00 per
month.
Although defendant is financially secure and capable of
providing support for David, he maintains that the Social
Security entitlement David receives should be factored in by the

Court in determining defendant support obligation.

Pursuant to

U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(8)(a), such benefit to a child in the child's
own right, may not be included in gross income for purposes of
calculating child support.

Thus, the Court will not offset

defendant's support obligation with the Social Security death
benefits David receives as a result of his mother's death.

5.

The Court, noting that defendant presently has two

minor children with his present spouse for which he provides the
sole support for, will allow defendant credit for his support
obligation for those children.

Thus, the Court will allow

defendant a credit a $1,157.00 for his support obligation to his
younger minor children pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(4)(a),(b),
the Worksheet To Determine Father's Obligation To Children In His
Present Home, and the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Table
set forth in U.C.A. §78-45-7.14.

(See Attachment A ) .

Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6), a difference of at least
25% between the existing child support order and what the child
support obligation would be under the Utah Uniform Child Support
Guidelines utilizing the parties' current incomes constitutes a
material change of circumstances that would justify the Court
modifying an existing child support order.

Thus, based upon

defendant's gross monthly income of $7,008.52 and the $1,157.00
credit for the children in his present home, the Court finds that
a difference of more than 25% does exist between defendant's
existing support obligation and what his support obligation would
be under the present Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines.

Court will order the modification retroactive to February 5,
1993, the date of Janet Bowcutt Wing's death.
Defendant is entitled to a credit against child support
arrearages resulting from the retroactive modification for the
$250.00 that he paid directly to Mrs. Jensen in November of 1993
and for the amounts that have been deposited into Mr. Moody's
trust account subsequent to the Court's previous Ruling issued
November 24, 1993. The funds currently being held in Mr. Moody's
trust account are to be turned over to Mrs. Jensen and an
appropriate Judgement for any amounts in arrearage will be
entered against the defendant and awarded to Mrs. Helen Jensen,
Guardian and Conservator for David Charles Bowcutt.

7.

Pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals decision in

Purfee v. Durfee. 796 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), regarding the
trial court's discretion to make such arrangements as may be
required by the circumstances of a given case to ensure that a
child receives the support ordered, the Court will order that
defendant make the child support payment directly to Mrs. Helen
Jensen, Guardian and Conservator for David Charles Bowcutt.
Mrs. Jensen may disperse these funds to herself and other
third parties, such as the Prentice family, with whom David has
been residing with periodically and who are engaged in providing
David with the care and support necessary for a seventeen year
old boy.

The Court further orders Mrs. Jensen to submit to the

Court on a quarterly basis, a detailed accounting of how the
child support award is being expended on David's behalf.

($596.00 - $125.00 = $471.00 -5- $596.00 = .79%).

Therefore, the

Court will modify defendant's child support obligation for David
Charles Bowcutt to $596.00 per month.

6.

(See Attachment B)•

With regard to the issue of whether the modification of

defendant's child support obligation should be retroactive to the
date the State of Utah filed a Petition To Modify on June 11,
1992 as Intervenor on behalf of the custodial parent, Janet
Bowcutt Wing, who had sought public assistance for the minor
child, the Court will refer to U.C.A. §30-3-10.6(2) which states:
,f

A child or spousal support payment under a child support
order may be modified with respect to any period during
which a petition for modification is pending, but only from
the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee,
if the obligator is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if
the obligee is the petitioner."
Although the Court would be inclined to make the modification of
defendant's child support obligation retroactive to the date the
State of Utah filed its Petition, the Court notes that no Return
Of Service for defendant was ever filed in this matter, although
plaintiff Janet Bowcutt Wing was served with the State Of Utah's
Petition To Modify and an appropriate Return Of Service was
filed.

However, the Court notes that all parties involved in

this matter, Mrs. Jensen, the defendant, and Mr. Wilkerson, the
Guardian Ad Litem agreed at the March 18, 1994 hearing that any
modification of the child support award should be made
retroactive to the date of the custodial parent's death.
Therefore, based upon that the parties' agreement as to when the
modification of defendant's child support obligation should take
effect presented to the Court at the March 18, 1994 hearing, the

court ordered to do so, defendant will be responsible for all
costs associated with such therapy for David Bowcutt.

9.

With regard to the issue of an award of attorney fees

and costs in this matter, the Court notes that Mrs. Jensen filed
an Affidavit In Support Of Attorney's Fees on or about March 18,
1994 and defendant filed an Objection To Affidavit In Support Of
Attorney Fees on or about March 25, 1994.
The Court will refer to Lynale v. Lvnale. 831 P.2d 1027
(Utah App. 1992), in which the Utah Court of Appeals stated that:
f,

In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree,

an award of attorney fees is based solely upon the trial
court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the
moving party."
In the above-entitled matter, Mrs. Jensen was forced to bring the
defendant before this Court in order to obtain support for
defendant's minor child.

The Court, noting that defendant had

previously taken the position that his support obligation was
extinguished by the death of the custodial parent, believes the
Mrs. Jensen had little choice in bringing this matter before the
Court in order to obtain the support necessary for the minor
child, David Bowcutt.

Thus, upon review of the Affidavit In

Support Of Attorney's Fees filed by Ms. Blakelock on or about
March 18, 1994, the Court will elect to award Mrs. Jensen
$1,000.00 in attorney fees and $105.00 for costs associated in
pursuing this matter.

Appropriate judgement against the

defendant may be entered.

Additionally, the Court would remind Mrs. Jensen that these funds
are not to be turned over directly to David for use at his
discretion.

This child support award is to be used by Mrs.

Jensen and the other third party care providers who are assisting
Mrs. Jensen in providing a home for David for reimbursement for
the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in providing care,
support, and a home for this minor child.

Any remaining funds

may be turned over to David upon him attaining majority.

8.

Additionally, the Court is gravely concerned over the

emotional needs and well-being of this young man, David Bowcutt.
The Court heard testimony from Mrs. Jensen, the defendant, and
Mr. Wilkerson, David's Guardian Ad Litem at the March 18, 1994
hearing that David is a young man who appears at times to be out
of control, troubled, and in need of therapeutic assistance in
helping deal with the trauma he has suffered as a result of the
circumstances of his mother's death.
parties are before him solely for the

The Court, noting that the
purpose of determining the

child's needs and defendant's present income, does not have
jurisdiction over this minor child and can not order David to
participate in therapy.

In the event that Mrs. Jensen, as

David's Guardian, or Mr. Wilkerson, as David's Guardian Ad Litem,
should determine that it would indeed be in David's best interest
to seek therapeutic assistance, then they may refer the matter to
Division of Family Services for an investigation and possible
referral to the Juvenile Court.

Regardless of whether David

decides to participate in therapy voluntarily or is eventually

•10. Counsel for Mrs. Jensen is directed to prepare an
appropriate order consistent with the aforementioned ruling.

DATED at Provo, Utah this

<J-

BY THE COURT:

cc:

Rosemond Blakelock
Robert Moody
Ron Wilkerson

day of April, 1994

ATTACHMENT "B"

IN THE

FOURTH
UTAH

DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

•IANCT SUE BOWCUTT

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKS!
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY
vs.

rnnlNb.

784448131

DON LESLIE BOWCUTT

L Enter tfaecombined number of nansai and adopted children of this mother
and father.
2a. Enter thefather'sand mother's gross monthly inrnmc.
Refer to Instructions for definition of income.
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is nonntly paid.
i
(Do not enter alimony ordered Bar this case).
2c. Enter previously ordered child suppon. (Do not enter oblignrinns
ordered for the children in this case).
2d. Optional: FTTTTT the amountfromLineranf the rhflrfm iaPtwmgmi^
Worirshffigt far egfacr tmcirt.
3- SobczactLaie2b*2c%and2dfiom2aL This is die Adjusted Mowhiy
Grossfarchild support purr* *^*4* Take the COMBINED fi^my is IT*1* 3 and the «»whw Q£ children in T m»
1 to the Support Table, Find the Base Combined Support ObEgaaog,
5- Divide each parents adjusted monxhiyjross in line 3 by tbeCOMBINED
adjusted monthtv gross in Line 3.
6. MulnpiyUne4byIjne5£Dreadip8rentmobGun
pai em's share of
the Base Support Obligation,

7.008.52

1,157.00

fellllii

5,851 .52 I 5,85'

59(

TBPB333DCQD3S PSX^L 0 0 1

&• Ester the monthly WQCJC ortraxnmc xeiaxeu cnuo
the children in Line 1,

firte

9. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
Brum down the amount in Line 6farthe Obligor parent,
10. Adjusted Base Guld Support Award
Stibium the Obligor's r **** 7ficom.TJnr 9,
1L Adjusted Base Child Support Awani per Child
Divide Line 10 by Line L
12. CHILD CARE AWARD
Multiply Line 8 by ,50 to obtain obligor's share of child care <m»j'»v Add to Line 10 only

596.00

ATTACHMENT

IN THE

"A

DISTRICT COURT

FOURTH
UTAH

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JANET SUE BOWCUTT

WORKSHEET TO DETERMINE FATHE
OBUGATIONSTO CHILDREN IN HI
PRESENT HOME

vs.
Don LESLIE BOWCUTT

Civil No.

784448131

Current Spouse's Name
1. Enter the number of natural and adopted children of the father and
his current spouse in the home.
2a. Enter the father's and his current spouses gross monthly income.
See instructions for definition of income.
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony actually paid.
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case).
2c. Enter pre-existing ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations
ottered for the children in this case).
3. Subtract line 2b and 2c from Line 2a. This is the Adjusted Monthly
Gross for child support purposes.

7,008

7,008.52

-0-

4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of children in Line
1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support Obligation.

1,157

5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED
adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.

-0-

6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of
ifae Base Support Obligation

-0-

%

100

%

1,157.00 pspt**?
*&*$<&&£•

7. later the monthly uninsured medical expenses for the children in l i n e i.
8. Enter the monthly work or training related child care expenses for the
the children in Line 1.

ia-,i''vlr''*:"fiWi'<r~'v''**'r'* • • • ' • • - • - - ' v ' A " ' ' 1 " ' , > \ A V A ' - / | j i j - , - v - « - ^ v ' ' " v - - •'•;•

9. FATHER'S SHARE OF BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD FOR THE CHILDREN IN
LINE L Enter the amount for thefatherfrom Line 6.
10. FATHER'S SHARE OF UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES OF THE CHILDREN
IN LINE L Multiply the amount in Line 7 by a proposed ratio, and enter result here.
11. FATHER'S SHARE OF WORK OR TRAINING RELATED CHILD CARE EXPENSE
OF THE CHILDREN IN LINE 1. Multiply Line 8 by JO. and enter result here.
12. FATHER'S SHARE OF TOTAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TO THE
CHILDREN IN LINE L Add Lines 9.10. and 11. This amount may be used to adjust the
father's gross income on the sole, split or joint custody worksheets.

w

1,157.00

c-,r.Vi' 13 Frt't-W

ROSEMOND BLAKELOCK #6183
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner
37 East Center, 2nd Floor
Provo, UT 84601
Telephone: (801) 375-7678

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
:
::
:

JANET SUE BOWCUTT,
Plaintiff

ORDER ON RULING:
CHILD SUPPORT

vs.
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT,
Defendant.

::
:

Case No. 784448131
Judge Steven L. Hansen

THIS MATTER came before the Court on an Evidentiary Hearing
regarding the Defendant's child support obligation for the parties7
minor child, David

Charles Bowcutt.

Helen Jensen, maternal

grandmother, Guardian and Conservator for the minor child, David
Charles Bowcutt, was present and represented by Rosemond Blakelock.
Defendant was present and represented by Robert Moody,

Ron

Wilkerson, Guardian Ad Litem for David Charles Bowcutt, was

also

present.

At that time the court heard discussion and testimony

regarding the Defendant's ability to provide support for the minor
child and the minor child's status and needs for support and took
the matter under advisement.
Subsequently, the Court having reviewed the documentation,
considered

all the evidence, and being fully advised

in the

premises, issued Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law.
Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law,
the Court makes the following:

ORDER

1.

The

934402209,

Court
Case

orders

Number

the

consolidation

93440310

and

Case

of

case

Number

number

784448131

consolidated into one number, Case Number 784448131. All documents
pertaining to this matter are to be filed under case Number
784448131.
2.

The Court shall not offset the Defendant's support

obligation with the Social Security death benefits the minor child
David receives as a result of his mother's' death.
3.

Based

upon

the

Defendant's

gross

monthly

income

of

$7,008.52, and allowing a credit for the Defendant's obligations to
children

in

his

present

home,

the

Court

shall

modify

the

Defendant's child support obligation for David Charles Bowcutt to
$596.00 per month, retroactive to February 5, 1993, the date of
Janet Bowctt Wings's death.
4. Defendant shall be entitled to a credit against child
support arrearages resulting from the retroactive modification for
the $250.00 that was paid directly to Mrs. Jensen in November,
1993, and credit for any amounts deposited into Mr, Moody's trust
account subsequent to the Court's November 24, 1993 Ruling.
5. The funds held in Mr. Moody's trust account shall be turned
over to Mrs. Jensen.

6. A Judgment shall be entered for the amount of $8,940.00
($596 per month from

February, 1993 through April, 1994) minus

credit for $250.00 and a credit for the amount held in Mr. Moody's
trust account.
7. Future child support payments shall be made directly to
Mrs. Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator for David Charles
Bowcutt.
8. Mrs. Jensen shall disperse these funds to herself and other
third parties, such as the Prentice family, with whom David has
been residing periodically and who are engaged in providing David
with care and support.
9. Mrs. Jensen shall submit to the Court on a quarterly basis,
a detailed accounting of how the child support award is being
expended on David's behalf.

The first report due in August, 1994

for the period of May through July, 1994.
10. The child support funds shall not be turned over directly
to David for his use at his discretion.

If the funds are not used

for ongoing support needs, they may be turned over to David upon
his majority.
11. Defendant shall be responsible for all costs associated
with any therapy needs for David Bowcutt.
12. Helen Jensen is awarded a judgment against the Defendant
in the amount of $1,000.00 in attorney's fees and $105 in costs.
/
/
/
/

13. Judgment may be entered against Defendant for $1,105.00,
for attorney's fees and costs.

DATED AND EFFECTIVE this {JL day of

li/UM

., 1994

BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM

:Jk^Sftf

Robert Mood

4-504 NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY
TO: Robert Moody;
You will please take notice that he undersigned attorney for
Petitioner will submit the above and foregoing Order to the Court,
for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of
this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written
objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of
the Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah.
DATED this

^

day of

fa z^

1994.

OSEMOND G.
2LOCK
Attorney for Petitioner

